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The Concept of Abstract Labour in Adam Smith’s  
System of Thought+  
 
 
Eric Rahim*  
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The starting point of this paper is Kenneth Arrow’s recognition that Adam Smith did 
not suppose the phenomenon of division of labour to derive from innate individual 
differences among people (an idea that underpins neoclassical economics); Smith, on 
the contrary (as indeed dictated by his purpose of elucidating the process of growth) 
envisaged labour as essentially homogeneous or ‘abstract’ (Marx’s term). The paper 
goes on to argue that Smith, rather than attributing productivity gains from 
specialisation to the exploitation of differing individual capabilities, understands such 
gains to result from economies of scale as growing markets permit increasing degrees 
of specialisation, thus yielding lower unit costs in production. Furthermore, Smith 
recognises that to maintain the ‘natural balance’ of industries in a growing economy – 
which is essential to ensure the continuance of growth - two things are necessary: (1) 
that the price mechanism, working through the profit motive, guides the allocation of 
resources, and (2) that productive resources are fully flexible – adaptable to the 
changing requirements of an evolving industrial economy, or, in other words, that 
resources (essentially labour) are potentially homogeneous or abstract.  Finally, this 
discussion leads on to an unconventional reading of Smith’s famous statement about 
the ‘invisible hand’, interpreting the virtue of the invisible hand not in the usual 
subjectivist terms of consumer satisfaction, but in terms of its making possible a 
process of on-going growth by ensuring the maintenance of the proper (‘natural’) 
balance of industries.  
                                                 
+
 My thanks go to Roy Grieve for his many helpful comments during the preparation of this paper.  
*
 E-mail: e.rahim@strath.ac.uk 
 2
  
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Commenting on the special role that the division of labour plays in the Wealth of 
Nations, Kenneth Arrow observes that Adam Smith’s idea that people benefit by 
specialising in particular tasks or trades and exchanging their services or goods with 
each other ‘has been the basis of the most significant strand in the development of 
economics in the ensuing two hundred years.’ In this context he refers to Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage according to which countries with different natural 
endowments benefit from trade by specialising in doing what they   do best. ‘The 
Ricardo viewpoint’, he observes, ‘extended from foreign trade to the domestic market, 
has been predominant in subsequent economic theory [founded by Alfred Marshal, 
Leon Walras and Stanley Jevons]. Like differences in natural resources, the 
differences in individual talents are the basis of [specialisation] and trade.’ Arrow 
also notes that this view departs from Smith’s formulation in which ‘people are very 
much alike, but they have chosen to specialise in different ways because they can do 
better to be a specialist.’  (Arrow 1979:154-55, italics added) In other words, Smith 
rejects the notion that the utilisation of comparative advantages of different 
individuals is the basis of division of labour in society. Specialisation rests on 
something other than intrinsic differences between individuals. Arrow does not follow 
up on this observation; nor does he say anything on the place that this idea has in 
Smith’s system of thought. This observation of Arrow’s provides the starting point of 
the present discussion.  It will be argued that the conception of labour as ‘abstract’ 
labour, that is, as a productive resource which is characterised not by the possession 
of particular abilities and skills but as flexible and adaptable as circumstances may 
require, occupies a fundamental place in Smith’s thinking. Given the objective that he 
had set for his work he could not have gone the other way.  
 
2. The philosopher and the common street porter  
 
It will be useful for our purpose to see how Smith is led to making the observation 
regarding the similarity of ability and talents among different people. After having, in 
the first chapter of his book (Smith 1976), identified the kind of economy that is the 
subject of his analysis – one that is characterised by a fairly advanced degree of 
division of labour – and division of labour as the principle cause of the wealth of 
nations, Adam Smith, in the following chapter, raises the question of the ‘principle 
which gives occasion’ to this phenomenon. In every civilised society (he tells us) man 
stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of his fellowmen. This 
creates conditions for the emergence of exchange, a pre-condition for division of 
labour to come into existence. Since exchange takes place only when people are 
producing different things, he raises the question as to why one person chooses to 
specialise in one particular product and another in some thing else. Is it because of 
their different intrinsic abilities and comparative advantage in the production of 
different things? The manner in which Smith proceeds to deal with this question is 
interesting. He writes (Smith 1976, Book I. Chapter ii: 27-28):  
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 In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a particular person makes bows and arrows, 
for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently 
exchanges them for cattle or venison with his companions, and he finds at last 
that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison, than if he himself went 
to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the 
making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a 
sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little 
huts or moveable houses…..   
 
And so on. In this way different people come to ‘dedicate’ themselves to particular 
activities and we have the emergence of a community of specialist producers.  
 
Smith, presumably tracing the historical origins of specialisation, seems to be leaning 
towards the comparative advantage view, a view whose provenance can be traced 
back to Plato.1 It was expressed by a contemporary of Smith in the clearest possible 
terms: ‘Men are endued with various talents and propensities, which naturally dispose 
and fit them for different occupations; and are… under a necessity of betaking 
themselves to particular arts and employments, from their inability of otherwise 
acquiring all the necessaries they want, with ease and comfort. This creates a 
dependence of one man upon another, and naturally unites men into societies.’2   
 
Having apparently gone in this direction, Smith immediately distances himself from 
this viewpoint and comes down firmly, though in his characteristic cautious manner, 
on the opposite side. He writes (Smith 1976, I. ii: 28-29):  
 
The difference of natural talents in different men is in reality much less than 
we are aware of; and very different genius which appears to distinguish men 
of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many 
occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of labour. The 
difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and 
a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, 
as from habit, custom and education… (emphasis added) 
 
He goes on in this vein and concludes that in the absence of division of labour ‘All 
must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do, and there could 
have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any 
great difference of talents’ (Smith 1976, I. ii: 29).  This view is reinforced later in 
Book V where, discussing the deleterious effects of the division of labour (within the 
plant), he tells his readers that the ‘understandings’ of men ‘are necessarily formed’ 
by the kind of work they perform. (V. i.: 781-82). Thus, abilities, skills and 
‘understandings’ are acquired through education, training and experience; they are not 
the result of natural endowments.  
                                                 
1
 Plato (1953: 212): ‘… we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted 
to different occupations.’ Again (on the same page): ‘We must infer that all things are produced more 
plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him...’  ).          
2
 Smith 1976: I. ii: 28. (Editors’ footnote quoting J. Harris, author of An Essay upon Money and Coins, 
London, 1757).  
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There can be little doubt that Smith actually subscribed to the doctrine of the ‘natural 
equality of all men’ (and, presumably, women) generally held by his Enlightenment 
contemporaries.3 But to follow Smith’s general line of thinking, and, indeed even to 
accept it, we do not need to adopt the view that all human beings are, as it were, born 
with a ‘clean slate’, nor should we allow ourselves to be sidetracked into the nature-
versus-nurture debate. The position adopted in this paper may be summed up as 
follows. Smith does not require for his analysis as strong an assumption as the one he 
is making here. Without departing from the essentials of Smith’s argument in the 
Wealth of Nations we may allow that, although individuals may   have different 
potentials, these differences are such that they can be neglected for the purpose of 
discussing the problem in hand. The problem of course is to understand the nature and 
causes of the growth of an economy in which the phenomenon of the social division 
of labour has come firmly to be established. In the context of a dynamic,  
evolving system it is appropriate to suppose that labour skills and abilities are not 
given and unchanging, but that they are acquired in response to the changing needs of 
the economy. Thus, to follow Smith we can do without the ‘clean slate’ assumption. 
All that is needed is to view the economy as one in which labour is seen as a resource 
that is reproducible (Ricardo) or conceptualised in abstract terms (Marx)4 - one that is 
to say in which the character of the labour supply will naturally adjust to the needs of 
the time. It is not denied that for the investigation of a different kind of problem in a 
different theoretical framework it may be quite appropriate to assume that ‘men are 
endued with various talents that dispose and fit them for different occupations’.   
 
3. Rationale of division of labour  
 
Smith’s adoption of the standpoint noted above raises an important question. What is 
the rationale of division of labour if we reject the principle of innate comparative 
advantages? That is, what does Smith put in place of the ‘ innate differences’ 
principle?  
 
We may start to answer this question by considering the famous example of the deer 
and beaver hunters  (I. vi). This is the situation – ‘that early and rude state of society 
which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land’ – in 
which (according to Smith) the labour-quantity principle is the only rule that can 
provide the basis of exchange. If it costs twice the labour to kill a beaver which it does 
to kill a deer, one beaver should ‘naturally’ exchange for two deer. (p.65) Note that it 
is ‘natural’ that the two should exchange in this ratio only because Smith is assuming 
that labour is potentially homogeneous or is seen in abstract terms. That is, if they 
exchange on the basis of the labour quantity principle the concrete forms in which 
their labour appears must be neglected. If that were not the case – if hunters’ skills 
were inborn rather than acquired – there would be no basis for the labour-quantity 
principle to be applicable. So the question is: given that hunters do not have any 
                                                 
3
 Thus, for instance, David Hume (1963: 454): ‘When we consider how nearly equal all men are in 
their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education, we must 
necessarily allow, that nothing but their consent could at first associate them together, and subject them 
to any authority.’  For a brief review of the views on this issue of some earlier thinkers, see Prendergast 
(1995).   
4
 Ricardo (1951, chapter I); Marx  (1976, chapter 1, section 2).   
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innate comparative advantage in any activity, why do they specialise in particular 
fields instead of satisfying their needs by undertaking both types of hunting?  
 
Smith does not answer this question in the present context (discussion of the theory of 
value, I. vi). This is because he has already dealt with it in the chapter  ‘Of the 
Division of Labour’ (I. i.). In this chapter, using a pin factory he had visited as an 
example, he shows how dividing a particular process of production into its various 
components and assigning a particular task to   a single worker improves labour 
productivity. He contrasts this way of doing things with a situation in which only one 
person attempts to perform all the distinct sequential operations by himself. In the first 
case, where the process has been divided up into eighteen distinct sub-processes and 
where the operation at each sub-process is performed by distinct hands the output per 
person is some thing like 5,000 pins a day. ‘But if they had all wrought separately and 
independently, and without any of them having been educated to this particular 
business, they could not each of them made twenty, perhaps not one pin a day….’ (I. 
i:15)  
 
The reasoning behind this way of thinking has been neatly summarised   by Arrow. 
Commenting on the first two reasons given by Smith for increase in labour 
productivity as a result of division of labour (repetition of a given task improves the 
worker’s dexterity and skill, and the saving of time that results when the worker 
concentrates on one task instead of moving from one sub-process to another), he 
writes (1979:154-55): 
 
When specialising, the individual is learning only what is necessary to 
accomplish a task and can, so to speak, spread the overhead of learning over a 
much longer run. A professional, such as a physician, is rather an extreme 
exemplification of this. A physician essentially serves you with knowledge 
about diseases… It would be possible for a person who was willing to spend 
five years or more at the task to acquire this knowledge. But obviously no 
individual can justify five years of learning devoted solely to the prospect of 
self-medication. It is socially worthwhile for some individuals to specialise in 
health care when that education can be used to handle many thousands of 
cases (emphasis added).  
 
Herein lies the rationale for the specialisation found in the tribe of beaver and deer 
hunters. Assuming that beaver and deer hunters have similar innate abilities with 
respect to hunting, it is socially desirable for one to concentrate his efforts on learning 
one hunting skill and for the other to invest time and effort in the acquisition of the 
other skill. Both will be more productive as a result, as compared with a situation 
where they chose to undertake both types of hunting. But specialisation is profitable 
only if ‘the overheads of learning can be spread over a longer run. That is, only if 
there are economies of scale in production. If that were not the case (and people had 
similar innate abilities) there would be no reason for specialisation. We would have to 
turn to the comparative advantage principle to explain the observed division of labour 
in society.   
 
This point of view is so fundamental to the Smithian system (in which the division of 
labour is the principal, if not the only, factor in the increase in the wealth of nations) 
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that we must pursue this it further. And for this we first turn to Smith’s discussion of 
division of labour within the enterprise   
 
We may ask, why the technique (with its eighteen sub-processes) that is used to 
produce nearly 5,000 pins a day cannot be used to produce, with the same degree of 
efficiency, at, say, the scale of 1,000 pins a day? The answer is, because Smith’s 
illustration assumes that production is characterised by economies of scale. When 
production is organised on a large scale (in response to increase in the size of the 
market) it is possible to find a technique of production that is more efficient than the 
one that is more appropriate for a smaller scale. And the larger investment associated 
with it can only be profitable when production is organised on a large scale. (In the 
absence of economies of large-scale production the same technique would be 
replicated both at small and larger scales of production and there would be no 
advantage in increasing the division of labour, and Smith’s entire argument would 
fail.) The importance of the size of the market, which in Smith’s theory of 
development occupies a central place, lies in the fact that it permits more detailed 
division of labour and realisation of economies of large-scale production.  
 
Although division of labour at the level of the shop floor is an essential element of the 
mechanism of growth, the process of development cannot be understood exclusively 
in terms of this factor. To get a more complete picture we have to turn to social 
division of labour or industrial specialisation. As in so many other cases, Smith 
explains an important idea by using a simple illustration (i. iii: 31). In ‘so desert a 
country as the Highlands of Scotland’ population is scattered in small, isolated 
hamlets. Here ‘every farmer must be his own butcher, baker and brewer for his own 
family’. Markets are too small to support specialised businesses of butchers, bakers 
and brewers. But let us now imagine that with general development (say, as a result of 
improvements in communications) taking place around the region there is 
enlargement of markets for meat, bread and beer. In Smith’s story this region will 
now begin to experience social division of labour. There will emerge specialist 
producers of meat, bread and beer. The reason for the emergence of specialisation has 
to do with larger markets and the possibilities they create for the adoption of 
techniques with greater division of labour and higher productivity – techniques that 
call for larger investment and that are profitable only when employed at large scales 
of production. That is the reason why the production of bread in one large bakery, say, 
for hundred families, is cheaper as compared with production at the level of the 
household. The same, of course, applies to other products. Eventually, with 
continuing economic expansion, households will give up domestic production of these 
items, and purchase them, through the market, from specialist producers. Farmer 
households will now be able to specialise in farming.  
 
To see more clearly the phenomenon envisaged here, let us extend Smith’s illustration 
a little further. Suppose that at an early stage of the development of this economy 
there are multi-product workshops producing wooden products such as cartwheels, 
agricultural implements, cabinets, and so on. Markets are yet too small to support 
specialist producers of these items. But as the market for, say, cartwheels increases 
there comes a point where the making of cartwheels splits off from general 
woodworking and comes to be undertaken by a specialist producer.  
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The reasoning behind this process of industrial differentiation has already been 
suggested. The specialist producer makes cartwheels at a larger scale than does the 
general woodworking shop (though, of course, the overall size of the latter may be 
larger than the former.) Because cartwheel production is on a larger scale the 
specialised producer can use more detailed division of labour and the specialist 
equipment that goes with this level of specialisation as compared with the multi-
product enterprise that must use general-purpose tools.5 The specialist producer is 
more efficient because total costs associated with the increased division of labour and 
the specialist equipment can be spread over a larger volume of output. Eventually, 
with the expansion of markets and through the actions of profit-motivated businesses 
cartwheel production becomes a distinct trade (and with further expansion of the 
market it will become further differentiated). The same argument applies to the 
making of agricultural implements, cabinets and other trades.  
 
The discussion of these issues leads directly into Smith’s theory of economic 
development. (See, for instance, Young 1928.)6 But it is not necessary, in the present 
context, to go further into that. I think we have achieved the objective set for this 
section: to identify the rationale for division of labour following upon Smith’s 
rejection of the comparative advantage principle. It lies in the phenomenon of 
economies of large- scale production. To summarise: increased specialisation results 
in greater efficiency, but requires higher initial investment; a larger market is 
necessary if this scale-related efficiency is to be exploited. Smith’s statement about 
innate similarities between people’s abilities is not a mere rhetorical flourish of an 
Enlightenment man. The idea that industrial specialisation does not derive from any 
inherent differences among people and that the skill composition of society evolves 
with the process of development is an essential aspect of Smith’s thinking on the 
subject.  
 
4. The natural balance of industry and the law of gravitation     
 
After having laid the groundwork for his theory of economic progress in the first three 
chapters of The Wealth of Nations, Smith turns to the theory of value. This raises an 
interesting question. Why, one may ask, someone whose principal concern is with the 
increase in the wealth of nations over time should not only be interested in the theory  
                                                 
5
 See Marx (1976, chapter 14) on the development of specialisation of tools as an aspect of the division 
of labour.  
6
 In order to emphasise the role of social division of labour (and, what he calls, ‘more roundabout 
methods of production’) in the process of development, Young (1928: 531), quite wrongly, in our view, 
underplays the importance of economies of large- scale production. As argued in the present 
discussion, the latter phenomenon is central to Smith’s view of social division of labour, and not 
merely ‘an incident in the general process by which increasing returns are secured …’    
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of value, but should give it an important place in his system of thought?7 Let us first 
try to answer this question.  
 
Social division of labour, according to Smith, pre-supposes exchange or the existence 
of some kind of a market. It therefore becomes important to understand how the 
market functions and the role it plays in the economy. In an earlier chapter (I. i: 22-
23)  Smith had indicated the context of his present discussion. There he asked his 
readers to consider the nature of social division of labour in the kind of economy that 
was the subject of his analysis. He asked them to imagine the making of a simple 
product as the coat of an ordinary labourer. Smith’s illustration shows that through 
direct and indirect industrial linkages, practically all the branches of the economy 
contribute to the manufacture of this item. More generally, Smith is visualising an 
economy in which every branch of production depends, directly or indirectly, on 
others for its inputs and therefore its operations. All industries are bound together in a 
network of quantitative relationships. There is  a ‘natural connection of all trades’.  
 
Now, we know that economic development is associated with increase in the social 
division of labour.  In a dynamic economy trades differentiate, they multiply in 
numbers, new industries emerge, old ones decline or disappear, capital accumulates 
and is distributed unequally across different industries. In other words, there is 
constant change in the structure of industry or constant disturbance of the ‘natural 
connection of trades’. But progress requires that there must be forces or a mechanism 
that restores the ‘natural connection of all trades’. If that were not the case there 
would be overproduction of some commodities and underproduction of others. Such 
imbalances, if they remained uncorrected, would result in the system breaking down.  
In Smith’s way of thinking it is the purpose of the theory of value to suggest the 
presence of tendencies that help correct the imbalances that inevitably arise in the 
course of economic progress.  
 
Thus, the theory of value or, what comes to the same thing, the theory of natural 
balance (stationary analysis), and the theory of development (dynamic analysis) do 
not, in Smith’s system, stand in opposition to each other. Study of the progress of 
division of labour leads Smith naturally toward a realisation of the need to discover a 
balancing or correcting mechanism that would tend constantly to restore the balance 
of the changing economy. It is thus perfectly understandable that after having 
considered the nature and progress of division of labour that Smith should turn to the 
theory of value which in his system of thought deals with the nature of such a 
mechanism.  
 
Let us now see what this mechanism is and how it works.  
 
We begin with the definition of natural price, the central concept in the system of 
natural balance Smith suggests in Book I, chapter vii. Natural price is that at which 
                                                 
7
. Kaldor (1972: 1240-41) in his powerful critique of neoclassical theory, argues that ‘economic theory 
went astray’ when the ‘theory of value took over the centre stage’. And this happened when Adam 
Smith, after having presented a brilliant account of the process of division of labour, was sidetracked 
into value (equilibrium) theory. I hope the present discussion will be seen as an effective rebuttal of 
Kaldor’s contention. (Kaldor recognises the central importance of increasing returns in Smith’s theory 
of development, but believes that Smith’s theory of value is based on the assumption of constant 
returns to scale.)  
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capital obtains the ‘natural’ rate of profit, labour receives the ‘natural’ rate of wages, 
and the same type of land the ‘natural’ rent. This definition and the approach to the 
theory of value it implies raises a number issues that have been the subject of much 
criticism.8 These issues do not concern us here since the problem discussed here 
relates to the nature of equilibrium and the adjustment process Smith has in mind. 
And in these respects Smith’s approach here, though open to certain objections, is no 
different from that in the so-called one-factor model of deer and beaver hunters. In 
both cases the problem is the same, namely, the maintenance of the balance of the 
system. In both cases, costs are conceptualised in objective terms and the balance of 
the system requires that there is a tendency toward equalisation of payments to those 
engaged in production. This will become clearer as we proceed.  
 
The natural price is distinguished from the market price. The market price is one at 
which the commodity is actually sold, given the ‘effectual’ demand of those who are 
prepared to pay the natural price. We note that the natural price is defined in a way 
that we know it before the commodity is brought to the market. It therefore rules out 
any notion of subjective factors entering its determination. By contrast, the market 
price (as we will see presently) is determined by the current demand for the product 
without reference to costs. While in the first case it is the costs that are the governing 
factor, in the latter it is entirely the subjective factor.  
 
When producers actually receive natural prices, that is, when natural prices coincide 
with market prices, (when the profit rate everywhere is at its natural level) they are 
satisfied with their production plans. They are selling at the ‘right’ prices – prices at 
which their long-term costs are recovered and they obtain the natural or ‘ordinary’ 
rate of profit.9 In this situation business decisions are mutually consistent and the 
quantitative relations between industries are being ‘reproduced’, that is, business 
operations at the current level can be repeated during the next year. This is Smith’s 
‘natural balance of industry’ (economy), a situation in which the ’natural connection 
of all trades’ is being maintained. As there is no incentive for producers to shift their 
resources from one branch of production to another, Smith refers to this situation 
(where the natural rate of profit prevails in all branches of production) as one of 
‘repose and continuance’. Having thus established the condition for the natural 
balance to prevail, he goes further and claims that the actual economy is ‘constantly 
tending’ toward this state. ‘The natural price, therefore, is, at it were, the central price 
to which prices of all commodities are continually gravitating (I. vii: 75).  
 
Let us now consider the law of gravitation Smith has in mind.  
 
To direct our attention to the essence of Smith’s argument (I. vii) we consider the case 
of only two commodities, say, ‘A’ and ‘B’, and ignore the influence that changes in 
the output of these commodities may have on other parts of the economy. We start 
from a position where the system is in its natural balance, and imagine that it is 
disturbed by, say, a shift of demand from commodity ‘B’ to commodity ‘A’. In the 
Smithian ‘short run’ the quantity of commodity ‘A’ placed on the market is given – a 
situation that arises from the fact that resources employed in the industry with all their 
                                                 
8
  See, for instance, Sraffa (195: section IV) for Ricardo’s objections to Smith’s ‘adding up’ theory of 
value.     
9
 To focus on the essentials of Smith’s argument we will ignore rent which in any case receives less 
than satisfactory treatment in his discussion (I. xi).  
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technical characteristics and physical form are fixed in their present uses, and 
resources employed in the production of commodity ‘B’ (for which demand has 
fallen) cannot be transferred so as to increase the production of ‘A’.  Thus, with the 
quantity of product ‘A’ placed on the market being fixed and with an increase in the 
demand for it, buyers are unable to obtain this commodity in the quantities they want 
at its natural price. Competitive bidding on the part of buyers raises the market price 
above the natural price to the point where the market is cleared at the market price. 
Profits of producers of ‘A’ rise above the normal rate ( as those of the producers of 
‘B’ sink below it). Note that the link with costs of production is broken, the new 
market price, as indicated, is determined entirely by the eagerness of buyers. We may 
also say that the commodity ‘A’ (and resources employed in its production) has 
become relatively more scarce.  This scarcity arises from the fact that while these 
resources are fixed in their concrete, physical form (and in the short run resources 
from the production of ‘B’ cannot be transferred to the production of ‘A’) demand for 
their services has increased. The new market price reflects this scarcity.  
 
The same analysis applies to the market for commodity ‘B’. Briefly, here competition 
of sellers pushes the market price below the natural price, the lower market price 
reflecting the fact the commodity (and the resources used in its production) has 
become less scarce. And this because resources used here are fixed in their concrete 
form and the demand for their services has declined. The producers of commodity ‘B’ 
are obtaining less than normal profits, possibly suffering losses.  
 
This situation may be one of ‘equilibrium of supply and demand’ (the markets are 
cleared), but for Smith it is neither one of ‘repose’ nor of ‘continuance’. The situation 
is inherently unstable. And this instability arises from the fact that profits rates in the 
two industries are unequal. Businesses producing the commodity ‘B’ will want to 
shift some of their resources into the production of commodity ‘A’ where the profits 
are supernormal. The natural balance can only be restored when the profits in both the 
industries are equal. So the question arises: what are the conditions that will equalise 
the profit rate in the two industries and thus restore the balance of the system?  
 
First, and this is obvious, there must be competition in the sense that there are no 
institutional barriers to the movement of resources between the two industries. That is, 
in our illustration, producers of commodity ‘B’ should be able to move some of their 
resources into the industry producing commodity ‘A’. But mobility of resources - in 
the simple sense, that particular resources with given characteristics can move from 
one application to another – is not a sufficient condition to restore Smith’s natural 
balance. Whether or not the natural balance of the system will be established depends 
further on the assumption we make about the nature of the resources that will move 
from one industry to the other. If, for instance, we conceptualise resources, as they 
move from one industry to the other, such that they retain their concrete, physical 
form the natural balance of the system will not be restored. It would still essentially be 
the Smithian ‘short run’, though in a modified form. Prices would still reflect relative 
scarcities of resources and profit rates will not be equalised. For the Smithian balance 
to be restored the resources must be assumed to be able to change their physical form 
so that when they move from the production of ‘B’ to the production of ‘A’ they 
replicate the characteristics of the resources in the latter. That is, they must lose the 
characteristic – their concreteness - that makes them more or less scarce. Only then 
will the market price coincide with the natural price. Thus, to revert to the illustration 
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of the deer and beaver hunters: beaver hunters when they move into deer hunting must 
become deer hunters (just like the existing deer hunters) and their simple tools can be 
re-fashioned for deer hunting (just like those of deer hunters), and vice versa. Only 
then will there be tendency for the equalisation of earnings and the restoration of the 
Smithian natural balance. The law of gravitation requires competition in this precise 
sense: labour and resources in general (except those like Ricardo’s ‘land of peculiar 
quality’ and ‘rare statutes’) are conceptualised as potentially homogeneous or abstract 
(Ricardo 1951: 12).  
 
To conclude: It has been suggested that Smith’s approach the theory of value is 
dictated by his broader objective, to inquire into the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations over time. In an economy undergoing change accumulating capital is 
distributed in different branches of production in different proportions, old industries 
die or decline and are replaced new branches of production, existing resources, e.g. 
labour skills and equipment are replaced by new ones. This means that a growing 
economy is characterised by persistent imbalances. Smith’s theory of value suggests a 
mechanism that ensures that such imbalances are corrected. It has been argued in this 
section that the concept of abstract labour in its general form that includes all 
producible resources, as a tendency, has a central place in the balancing mechanism 
devised by Smith.  
 
5. The ‘general interest’ of society 
 
We see how the market works and how the pursuit of profit motive results, as a 
tendency, in the economy maintaining its balance. But Smith goes further and claims 
that individuals, while pursuing their gain, also promote the ‘general interest’ of 
society.10 Our aim in the present section is to consider this claim. We will see that our 
preceding discussion suggests a reading of Smith’s observation regarding the general 
interest that is different from the usual story. It will be argued that Smith’s famous 
remark about the ‘invisible hand’ must be read in the context of his balancing 
mechanism, the operation of which depends on the existence of competitive markets 
and abstract labour.   
 
It is widely believed that Smith’s statement concerning the correspondence between 
the pursuit of self-interest and the general interest of society has provided a source of 
inspiration for the fundamental propositions of modern (neoclassical) economic 
theory.11 It may therefore to be useful, for the purpose of our exposition, to consider 
                                                 
10
 It is noteworthy that this statement is made in Book IV in the context of  Smith’s argument that 
public restraints and regulation may divert capital into channels into which it will not flow naturally 
and that this would result in distorting the natural balance of industry. It reads: ‘As every individual, 
therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestick 
industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual 
necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, 
neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring 
the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing 
that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention.’ (IV. ii: 456; see also p. 453)  
11
 Kaldor (fn.7 above) sees a continuous line of theoretical development from Smith through Ricardo, 
Walras, Marshall ‘right up to Debreu and the most sophisticated of present-day Americans.’ And, in 
the same vein, Samuelson (1992: 5) writes: ‘Given their respective dates we might better compliment 
Walras for his Smith-like approach to general equilibrium.’  
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Smith’s viewpoint with reference to the core standpoint of this theory. In this theory 
the focus is on the ‘final’ consumer. It is the individuals or households who own 
society’s resources. They have certain psychological preferences in relation to the 
goods they wish to consume. Businesses borrow or buy from households these 
resources and transform them into consumer goods – goods that households want. The 
outcome of the market process in which firms borrow or purchase resources from 
households and then sell them the consumer goods they desire is considered as 
socially optimal. In this situation, every individual in society, given his wealth and 
tastes, is maximising his utility; and one person’s wellbeing can only be increased at 
the cost of some one else’s. This is the ideal of social efficiency that the market 
achieves, the best possible allocation of resources. Given the initial distribution of 
resources among households, this outcome is conflict free and (some would go further 
and say) morally just. When political commentators talk of people’s ‘freedom of 
choice’ and the ‘consumer’s sovereignty’, this is the argument from which they are 
drawing their inspiration.  
 
Now the point to which we wish to direct attention is that this approach lies 
completely outside Smith’s way of thinking about how the capitalist economy works 
(and, indeed, how it should work). Smith is no proponent of the ‘sovereignty of the 
consumer’. The concept of consumer preferences as it appears in the modern theory, 
and, in general, a subjectivist approach to understanding the market economy,  has no 
place in his schema. Smith disdains all luxury consumption. In fact, he disapproves of 
all ‘unproductive’ consumption – consumption that does not contribute to the 
generation of investible surplus. He calls the ‘prodigal’ (the person who chooses to 
spend his inheritance on ‘unproductive’ consumption) a ‘public enemy’ (II. iii: 340). 
By exercising their ‘freedom of choice’ the prodigal and other ‘profligates’ (generally, 
members of the landed nobility) who are given to a life of luxury detract from capital 
accumulation.12 From the Smithian perspective, they are engaged in an anti-social 
activity. To Smith, it is only an expanding economy, fuelled by capital accumulation, 
that represents a socially desirable state of affairs – a point that will be taken up 
presently. It is therefore not surprising that Smith’s statement regarding the individual 
pursuit of self-interest promoting the ‘general interest’ of society appears not during 
his discussion of the theory of value (I. vii)) where the modern economist expects it to 
be,13 but in the dynamic analysis of Book IV.   
 
                                                 
12
 It is worth pointing out that when considering productive/unproductive consumption, Smith draws a 
sharp distinction between expenditure on durable and non-durable goods.  (II. iii. 346-47). The former 
is lesser of the two evils. While the food consumed at the dinner table of the ‘profligate’ nobleman 
perishes in the moment of its consumption, the dinning table has the potential of being used for 
productive purposes – it could one day be used as a desk for the bookkeepers of a pin factory. Rostow’s 
following comment, in our view, represents the conventional view (1992:40) : ‘Smith, in passages such 
as these, which apparently reject the ultimate legitimacy of consumer’s sovereignty, is writing as a 
moralist at least as much as a market analyst.’ In the interpretation suggested here, Smith’s distinction 
tells us that he saw consumption only from the perspective of capital accumulation.       
13
 For instance, Maurice Allais attributes the placing of this remark to faulty exposition. He writes: 
‘…Smith’s exposition is not without its faults, some of them major… The most important questions are 
in general dealt with incidentally and in connection with altogether subordinate questions. The best and 
perhaps most striking example of this is Smith’s famous aphorism about the ‘invisible hand’, which is 
lost in a very lateral comment of chapter 2 of Book IV.’ M. Allais (1992:.32) It is noteworthy that 
Smith’s statement about the pursuit of private self-interest leading to the promotion of the general 
interest of society appears not once but twice, and on both occasions in Book IV, chapter 2.  
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What are then Smith’s reasons for the claim that the pursuit of self-interest in a 
system of natural liberty (competitive market) promotes the general interest of 
society? In the interpretation suggested here, first, Smith argues that the pursuit of 
individual interest in a framework of competition promotes economic growth, and 
second, he equates, in a rather pragmatic way, economic growth with the general 
interest of society, the latter being equated with general prosperity (‘universal 
opulence’). We take these points up in turn.  
 
It is a fundamental postulate of Smith’s that human beings ‘naturally’ seek to improve 
their material condition. He therefore expects that people will use their own resources 
more wisely than if they were entrusted with other people’s capital. This is one of 
Smith’s arguments against entrusting investment decisions to public servants. He 
applies the same reasoning to servants of large private corporations in which 
ownership and management are separated. (Some of Smith’s strongest castigations are 
directed at the servants of the East India Company. See, for instance, IV. vii: 638-40.) 
In the same vein, Smith argues that individuals in their ‘local situation’ are better 
informed about what the market requires, and therefore, generally, the private 
individual producer is likely to make better informed investment decisions from his 
private viewpoint than would public servants. The latter are inevitably remote from 
particular ‘local situations’ and cannot be in possession of all the needed information 
that is diffused throughout the economy (IV. ii: 456).  
 
But human beings are made of crooked material. They love to reap where they have 
not sown, and, when possible, they will subvert the system to promote their self-
interest. Thus, there must be a social mechanism, a system of incentives, rewards and 
penalties that would ensure that only initiative, hard work and efficiency are rewarded 
and that slackness and inefficiency are penalised. The competitive market provides 
such a mechanism. Thus, individual initiative under conditions of competition, 
protected by institutions that guarantee security of person and property, is likely to 
produce better results with respect to efficiency and growth of the national product 
than state regulation and publicly owned enterprises.14
 
The competitive market also ensures that resources that are invested from motives of 
private profitability are invested productively from the social perspective. The 
important supposition here is that, generally (though not necessarily in every case), 
profit rate higher than the normal rate indicates a higher, and profit rate lower than the 
normal rate a lower social priority for investment in that particular branch of 
production. Thus, when profit-motivated businesses respond to market signals by 
undertaking new investments in the former and withdrawing capital from the latter 
they are performing a socially useful purpose.  
 
The idea underlying this standpoint has already been indicated. At any given stage of 
development, we have ‘the natural balance of industry’- a situation that shows that 
society’s capital stock is distributed in the economy in a way that it reproduces itself. 
But economic development and technical improvements constantly disturb this 
balance. There is, therefore, constant need to redistribute the existing and newly 
                                                 
14
 Note this is not a theoretical case against state intervention in economic activity. Governments are 
not all the same, some are more ‘profligate’ than others, just as servants of some are more accountable 
and socially conscious than others. And of course there are many socially desirable activities that only 
the state can perform. On the important place of institutions in Smith’s thought, see Rosenberg (1960). 
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accumulating capital between different sectors. It needs to be withdrawn from some 
and placed in others.  
 
Now Smith’s argument is that it is only under competitive market conditions that the 
actions of profit-motivated individuals help restore the economic balance. For 
instance, Smith’s strong attack on monopolistic privileges and state intervention is 
based on the view that they ‘derange’ the distribution of capital in the economy. The 
existence of monopoly means that too little capital goes into those industries that are 
protected from competition and too much into those that are unsheltered; and 
government servants, even with the best of intentions, will misallocate resources for 
lack of information. And that such distortions are inimical to economic progress (IV. 
ii: 453). The conclusion is that the social rationale of the competitive market lies first, 
in the fact that it provides a framework of incentives and penalties thus promoting 
efficiency and second, that it provides  signals for the correct distribution of capital in 
different branches of production; and that both these considerations help ensure 
continuing increase in the wealth of the nation.  
 
We turn now to our second point. We have seen that the pursuit of self-interest leads 
to increasing national wealth. But on what grounds can we equate increase in national 
wealth with the ‘general interest’ of society? Indeed, what do we mean by the ‘general 
interest’ of society?  
 
In Smith’s way of thinking the ‘general interest’ of society is understood entirely in 
terms of  ‘universal opulence’ or the general prosperity of the population. And the 
index of general prosperity is the wage rate, per capita income of ‘by far the greater 
part of population’. For instance:  ‘The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the 
necessary effect, so it is the natural symptom of increasing national wealth.’ (I. 
viii:.91) And (I. viii. 95):   
 
‘Servants, labourers, and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater 
part of every great political society. But what improves the circumstances of 
the greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No 
society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the greater part of the 
members are poor and miserable. 
 
Further, it is not great national wealth, but its sustained increase over time that 
generates general prosperity and rising incomes of the working people. The 
justification for the system of natural liberty is thus to be found in the increasing 
national wealth. To quote Smith again (IV. viii: .99):  
 
It deserves to be remarked, perhaps, that it is in the progressive state, while the 
society is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it has acquired 
the full complement of riches, that the condition of the labouring poor, of the 
great body of the people, seems to be the happiest and the most comfortable. It 
is hard in the stationary, and miserable in the declining state. The progressive 
state is in reality the cheerful and hearty state to all the different orders of 
society. The stationary is dull; the declining, melancholy.’   
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Here Smith’s reasoning seems to be as follows: If capital accumulation and 
development slow down (even at a high level of development) demand for labour will 
begin to slacken. But the supply of labour (an anticipation of the Malthusian ‘law’ of 
population) will continue to increase as long as the wage rate is above the subsistence 
level15. Eventually, with continuing slow-down in the rate of accumulation, the 
supply of labour will catch up with the demand for labour at the subsistence wage. 
When this situation materialises, we have the stationary state when ‘things are at a 
stand’ and when the ‘labouring poor’ receive no more than their ‘scanty maintenance’ 
(I. viii: 91). But when capital is accumulating and national wealth is increasing, 
demand for labour keeps ahead of supply. In these conditions, competition among 
employers for labour breaks down their combinations to keep wages down and the 
bargaining position of labour is strengthened. Thus, a buoyant market for labour 
ensures that wages – per capita income of the bulk of the population – keeps rising. 
Private initiative and competitive markets are to be preferred to state regulation and 
monopolistic privilege even in a stagnating economy, but if that was all that the 
principle of perfect liberty produced, that would give no cause for celebration.  
 
It will have been noted that the question of the long run behaviour of wages leads us 
toward Smith’s theory of income of distribution – a theory which has been subjected 
to much criticism.16 But the argument of this section does not depend on the adequacy 
of Smith’s theory of income distribution. The point that we have tried to make is that 
in Smith’s scheme of thought the proposition regarding the pursuit of private self-
interest resulting in the promotion of the general interest of society is entirely free of 
any subjective considerations (which dominate the approach of the modern theory); 
and this proposition makes sense only in the context of his principal concern - the 
increase over time of the wealth of the nation which he equates with the general 
interest of society. This is of course the same concern that necessitated the assumption 
of abstract labour.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
We have argued that the assumption of abstract labour by Smith is dictated by his 
choice of the kind of economy he is studying – a capitalist economy characterised by 
a fairly advanced degree of social division of labour – and the nature of the problem 
he is investigating – causes of increase in the wealth of nations. It was natural for him 
to conceptualise labour (and resources in general) as potentially homogeneous, rather 
than as one with fixed technical characteristics. And this because he saw the 
                                                 
15
 The subsistence wage in Smith is made up of two components. First, labour is an input as, for 
instance, farm animals are. In any viable economy, it has to be fed to reproduce itself. It is thus a 
requirement of the model that there is a limit below which the wage cannot fall without making the 
economic system unviable. The other component is socially determined. Labour is unlike farm animals: 
it is part of society, and by far the greater part of it. The subsistence wage must be such that it is 
‘consistent with common humanity’ (I. viii: 86). The size of this component is a product of economic, 
political and social development. It thus changes over time: with economic growth it rises over time, 
but it can also fall if economic conditions deteriorate. It is not possible to go into any detail on this 
aspect of Smith’s thinking, but two points may be noted. The notion that a crucial economic variable is 
influenced by political, cultural and social factors is quite fundamental to his standpoint on the 
determination of the natural rate of wages. But, at the same time, Smith’s argument can also been seen 
as pointing in the opposite direction – toward the determination of wages by the forces of supply and 
demand. On this see Dobb (1973, 1975).  
16
 For instance, Dobb (1973). For a discussion of  Dobb’s critique of Smith, see Bharadwaj (1978).  
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development process in terms of advancing social division of labour, creation of new 
industries, and skills and other resources to suit the requirements of the time. The 
alternative assumption of concrete labour would have left no room for the principle of 
objective historical change, a principle on which Smith’s mind was focused. This 
interpretation of Smith’s thinking has suggested a new reading of the famous 
statement about the role of the invisible hand that is free from any subjective 
considerations.  
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